Machine Learning (ML) is widely used for predictive tasks in a number of critical applications. Recently, collaborative or federated learning is a new paradigm that enables multiple parties to jointly learn ML models on their combined datasets. Yet, in most application domains, such as healthcare and security analytics, privacy risks limit entities to individually learning local models over the sensitive datasets they own. In this work, we present the rst formal study for privacy-preserving collaborative hierarchical clustering, overall featuring scalable cryptographic protocols that allow two parties to privately compute joint clusters on their combined sensitive datasets. First, we provide a formal de nition that balances accuracy and privacy, and we present a provably secure protocol along with an optimized version for single linkage clustering. Second, we explore the integration of our protocol with existing approximation algorithms for hierarchical clustering, resulting in a protocol that can e ciently scale to very large datasets. Finally, we provide a prototype implementation and experimentally evaluate the feasibility and e ciency of our approach on synthetic and real datasets, with encouraging results. For example, for a dataset of one million records and 10 dimensions, our optimized privacy-preserving approximation protocol requires 35 seconds for end-to-end execution, just 896KB of communication, and achieves 97.09% accuracy.
INTRODUCTION
Big-data analytics is an ubiquitous practice already impacting our daily lives. Our digital interactions produce massive amounts of data which are processed with the goal of discovering unknown pa erns or correlations that, in turn, can suggest useful conclusions and help making be er decisions. At the core of this lies Machine Learning (ML) for devising complex data models and predictive algorithms that provide hidden insights and automated decisions while optimizing certain objectives. Example applications successfully employing ML frameworks include market-trend forecast, service personalization, speech/face recognition, autonomous driving, health diagnostics, and security analytics.
Data analysis is, of course, only as good as the analyzed data, but this goes beyond the need to properly inspect, cleanse or transform "high-delity" data prior to its modeling. In most learning domains, analyzing "big data" is of twofold semantics: volume and variety.
First, the larger the dataset available to an ML algorithm, the be er the learning accuracy, as irregularities due to outliers fade faster away.
us, scalability to large inputs is very important, especially so in unsupervised learning, where model inference uses unlabelled observations. Second, the more varied the data collected for analysis, the richer the inferred information, as degradation due to noise is reduced and domain coverage is increased. Indeed, for a given learning objective, say classi cation or anomaly detection, combining more datasets of similar type but di erent origin, allows for more elaborate analysis and discovery of complex hidden structures (e.g., correlation or causality). us, the predictive power of ML models naturally improves when they are built as global models over multiple datasets owned and contributed by di erent entities, in what is termed collaborative learning-and widely considered as the golden standard [70] .
Privacy-preserving unsupervised learning. Several critical learning tasks, across a variety of di erent application domains (such as healthcare or security analytics), demand deriving accurate ML models over highly sensitive and/or proprietary data. By default, organizations in possession of such con dential datasets are le with no other option than simply running their own local models, severely impacting the e cacy of the learning task at hand.
us, in the context of data analytics, privacy risks are the main impediment against collaboratively learning over large volumes of individually contributed data.
e security community has recently embraced the powerful concept of privacy-preserving collaborative learning (PCL), the premise being that e ective analytics over sensitive data is feasible by building global models in ways that protect privacy. is is typically achieved by applying secure multiparty computation (MPC) or di erential privacy (DP) to data analytics, so that "learning" is performed over encrypted or sanitized data. One notable example is the recently proposed privacy-preserving federated learning in which model parameters are aggregated and shared by multiple clients to generate a global model [9] . Existing work on PCL almost exclusively address supervised rather than unsupervised learning tasks (with a few exceptions such as k-means clustering). As unsupervised learning is a prevalent learning paradigm, the design of supporting ML protocols that promote collaboration, accuracy, and privacy in this se ing is vital.
In this paper, we present the rst formal study for privacypreserving hierarchical clustering, featuring scalable cryptographic protocols that allow two parties to privately compute joint clusters on their combined sensitive input datasets. Previous work in this space introduces several cryptographic protocols (e.g., [17, 39, 40] ), but without rigorous security de nition and analysis.
Motivating applications. Hierarchical clustering is a class of unsupervised learning methods seeking to build a hierarchy of clusters over an input dataset (called dendrogram), typically using the agglomerative (bo om-up) approach. Clusters are initialized with single points and are iteratively merged using di erent cluster linkage (e.g., nearest neighbor and diameter for single and complete linkage, respectively). is is widely used in practice, o en in application areas where the need for scalable PCL solutions is profound.
In healthcare, for instance, hierarchical clustering allows researchers, clinicians and policy makers to process medical data in order to discover useful correlations that can improve health practices-e.g., discover similar groups of genes [23] , patient groups most in need of targeted intervention [55, 79] , and changes in healthcare costs as a result of speci c treatment [48] . To be of any value, such analyzed medical data contains sensitive information (e.g., patient records, gene information, or PII) that must be protected (also due to legislations such as HIPPA in US or GDPR in EU).
Also, in security analytics, hierarchical clustering allows enterprise security sta to process network and log data in order to discover suspicious activities or malicious events-e.g., detect botnets [34] , malicious tra c [54] , compromised accounts [12] , and classify malware [8] . Again, security logs contain sensitive information (e.g., employee/customer data, enterprise security posture, etc.) that must be protected (due to industry regulations or for reduced liability).
As such, without privacy-protection provisions in place for collaborative learning, data owners are restricted to apply hierarchical clustering solely on their own private datasets, thus losing in accuracy and e ectiveness. In contrast, our treatment of the problem as a PCL instance is a solid step towards employing the bene ts of hierarchical clustering over any collection of available datasets. For instance, our techniques enable multiple hospitals to combine their patients' records and jointly cluster their medical data, thus allowing to provide their patients improved treatment options. ey can also incentivize enterprises to combine their threat indicators and jointly cluster their security-related observations (e.g., determining whether threat indicators in two organizations are similar), thus allowing to provide more resilient "community-based" defenses against advanced threats. Importantly, in both cases, organizations remain compliant with privacy regulations on their private datasets.
Challenges and insights. Devising scalable and provably secure protocols for privacy-preserving collaborative hierarchical clustering entails a few technical challenges, as we brie y discuss.
e rst challenge relates to the required formal treatment of the problem at the functionality level. MPC guarantees that no party learns anything about the other party's input, other that what can be inferred directly from the joint output. But what if the output is a superset of the input? Indeed, the dendrogram output by hierarchical clustering includes the input data and o ers no privacy! To overcome this obstacle, we explore several re nements of hierarchical clustering that produce "redacted" outputs (i.e., dendrogram storing less information) and provide a de nition that captures an ideal trade-o between accuracy and privacy. We are the rst to present a formal security de nition for the problem at hand in Section 3. A number of challenges, then, relate to making the cryptographic protocols scalable to large datasets. Hierarchical clustering is already computationally heavy with running cost O(n 3 ) (n being the size of training data). Standard methods for secure two-party computation (e.g., Yao's garbled circuits [81] ) result in large communication, while use of fully homomorphic encryption [29] is still prohibitively costly, rendering the design of PCL protocols for hierarchical clustering a di cult task. Approximation algorithms for clustering such as CURE [35] is the de facto way to achieve scalability to massive amounts of data, however, incorporating both approximation and privacy protection in secure computation is far than obvious, and has not been considered previously in the literature.
We address these challenges through some unique insights that enable us to design practical PLC protocols for hierarchical clustering. First, in Section 4, we devise our main constructions as mixed protocols (e.g., [18, 36, 45] ). We carefully decompose the computation needed in each iteration of hierarchical clustering into building blocks that can be e ciently implemented via either garbled circuits or additive homomorphic encryption [59] . We then explore performance trade-o s in our design space and select a combination of building blocks that achieves fast computation and low bandwidth usage, wherein we employ garbled circuits for cluster merging and distance updates, but homomorphic encryption for distance computation.
Moreover, in Section 5, we show how our design can be further optimized, by e ciently incorporating an existing clustering approximation algorithm [35] into our main framework, to achieve the best of both worlds: strong privacy guarantees and scalability. We explore several variants that exhibit di erent trade-o s between computational overhead and accuracy. We believe that this combination of cryptography with approximation holds great potential as it can eliminate the overheads associated with MPC at a small cost in the accuracy of the computed results.
In Section 6, we perform a comprehensive experimental evaluation of our protocols both on synthetic and real datasets, showing that they have modest overheads in practice. For example, our privacy-preserving approximate clustering protocol for single linkage, running on a dataset of one million records of 10 dimensions, requires 35 seconds of end-to-end time, 896KB of communication, at an accuracy of 97.09%.
Finally, we review related work in Section 7 and we conclude in Section 8. We present secure comparison building blocks, complete security proofs, and additional experiments in the Appendix.
Contributions. We summarize our contributions as:
• We provide a formal de nition and design a provably secure mixed protocol for privacy-preserving hierarchical clustering supporting single and complete linkage.
• We present an optimized protocol for the case of single linkage that signi cantly improves computational overhead and communication cost.
• We propose a novel integration of widely used approximate clustering solutions into our protocols to produce versions that provide both scalability and strong privacy.
• We implement and experimentally evaluate our protocols both on synthetic and real datasets, validating their eciency.
SYSTEM MODEL AND BACKGROUND
Here we provide descriptions of a class of hierarchical clustering algorithms supported by our framework, the adversarial model considered by our work, and the necessary cryptographic tools that we leverage.
Hierarchical clustering. Hierarchical agglomerative clustering is an unsupervised learning method used for creating a hierarchy of clusters in an iterative fashion. Let D = { i } n i=1 be an unlabeled d-dimensional dataset, where i ∈ X d . X is the set of non-negative integers modulo 2 λ (e.g., λ = 32). We use the square Euclidian distance metric dist :
Hierarchical clustering (HC) is described in Figure 1 and graphically on the le of Figure 2 . HC proceeds iteratively by creating rst a cluster C( i ) for each datapoint i ∈ D. In each iteration, the closest clusters according to a cluster linkage distance are merged and cluster linkages are updated. Common linkage distances which we support in this work are single linkage or nearest
e clustering dendrogram T consists of the hierarchy of clusters created during this process (including the last level with the initial data points).
e algorithm halts when exactly t clusters are generated. Further, given T we can compute for each cluster C ∈ T , a representative rep(C) and its size size(C) = |C |. Most commonly, a cluster's representative is the centroid de ned as the average of all points in the cluster.
Problem de nition and adversarial model. We de ne for the rst time two-party privacy-preserving hierarchical clustering protocols. In our problem de nition, two parties contribute independent datasets P = (p 1 , . . . , p n 1 ) and Q = (q 1 , . . . , q n 2 ), with p i , q j ∈ X d . ey run a joint cryptographic protocol to generate a dendrogram T on the set D = P ∪ Q of size n = n 1 + n 2 . At the end of the protocol, the parties learn clusters' representatives and their sizes, while the input datasets are protected and not revealed during the cryptographic protocol. In this work we consider the se ing of semi-honest adversaries, following the vast majority of works that target e cient secure computations (e.g., the privacy-preserving data mining works discussed in Section 7). In this se ing, we assume that cheating parties follow the protocol, but try to infer additional information from the transcript of exchanged messages. We provide privacy de nitions that minimize the amount of leakage of the input datasets, while including relevant information about the dendrogram computation.
Secure computation. We formulate the security of our private hierarchical clustering algorithm using the strong notion of secure computation, which allows two parties to evaluate a function on their joint inputs, while guaranteeing that each party learns nothing about the other's input other than what can be inferred from the output itself.
Hierarchical Clustering
(a) Find closest clusters: Find the two closest clusters C( 1 ) and C( 2 ) at level i + 1 according to link-
For each level-(i + 1) node 1 , 2 , level-i contains a node u with C(u) ← C( ) and a directed edge is added from to u. Finally, level-i forms a new cluster C( ) with C( ) ← C( 1 ) ∪ C( 2 ) and two directed edges are added to T from 1 and 2 to .
(c) Update cluster linkage:
Compute linkage δ (C( ), C( )), for all at level i. We formalize our privacy requirements, using the standard twoparty ideal/real world paradigm [33] which involves the following simulation experiment. Consider an ideal world, where the parties interact with a functionality f implemented by a trusted third party that privately interacts with both of them, collects their inputs, performs the computation, and returns its output. Each party learns the nal output and, crucially, nothing else about the other party's input. In the real world, the trusted party is replaced by an interactive cryptographic protocol π executed jointly by the parties. Informally, π securely realizes f , if whatever can be learned by an adversarial party A while running this protocol, can be simulated by an algorithm, called the simulator Sim, that only interacts with the ideal functionality f , and does not know the other party's input. Homomorphic encryption. Homomorphic encryption allows one to perform algebraic manipulations directly over ciphertexts, without decrypting them. Evaluating arbitrary functions over encrypted values is theoretically possible with Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) [29] , but not yet fully practical. However, the weaker notion of partially homomorphic encryption, where only speci c arithmetic operations are supported, results in e cient implementations (e.g., [59, 62] ). We use Paillier's additively homomorphic encryption (AHE) [59] . e plaintext space is Z N , with N public RSA modulus and pk, sk the encryption/decryption key pair. We denote the encryption of m ∈ Z N by [m] (omi ing, for simplicity, the speci c public key used). Paillier guarantees that decrypting Yao's Garbled Circuits. is celebrated result by Yao [82, 83] has become one of the most widely adopted methods for secure twoparty computation. A Garbled Circuit (GC) protocol enables two parties P 1 , P 2 to evaluate a boolean circuit C on joint inputs x 1 , x 2 such that each party learns nothing about the other party's input, other than what can be inferred by the output . is is achieved by having one of them, called the garbler, generate an encrypted truth table for each gate in C. e other party, the evaluator, can then evaluate the circuit by sequentially decrypting these truth tables in a way that preserves input privacy.
SECURITY DEFINITION
In this work, we de ne privacy-preserving hierarchical clustering, according to standard de nitions [33] . We need to de ne an ideal functionality that upon receiving the two parties' inputs responds with the hierarchical clustering output, without revealing the private inputs. As it is evident from the hierarchical clustering description in Section 2, its output is the entire dendrogram T , from which the inputs can be immediately inferred. Due to this, we need to re-de ne the problem of hierarchical clustering to reveal less (but still useful) information. Below we describe gradually our approach to get to the nal de nition. Attempt 1: Removing the dendrogram. What if we simply remove the entire dendrogram T and just report the representatives rep( 1 ), . . . , rep( t ) and sizes |C( 1 )|, . . . , |C( t )| for each of the t clusters in layer t ? en the result is essentially similar as what can be achieved by simpler clustering techniques, e.g., k-means. However, the motivation for using hierarchical clustering in the rst place, is that the rich dendrogram structure provides insights on how the clusters where formed and in which order. For instance, in healthcare the dendrogram provides useful information about relationships between features and factors that contribute to prevalence of a disease [23] . In biology, the dendrogram's hierarchical structure could reveal interesting relationships between plants and animals, their habitat and ecological subsystems [32] . erefore, we need to keep the dendrogram structure, but reduce the amount of information it reveals about the exact inputs. Attempt 2: Keep only the dendrogram structure. A second approach is to keep only the dendrogram structure without the intermediate clusters C( ) at layers t + 1, . . . , n. is has the advantage of protecting the inputs at the last layer. However, it will reveal the exact mapping between input points and the nal clusters, which results in considerable leakage. For instance, a party can infer upper bounds on distances between its points and points owned by the other party, or distances between the other party's points since it knows the exact order in which clusters were merged. Attempt 3: Randomly permute nodes. We can further permute the nodes at each layer under a random permutation. is protects the mapping between inputs and clusters, but we "destroyed" too much information. In particular, the structure of permuted dendrogram only shows that two clusters were merged in each iteration, but this is something that the participants know already! We thus need to preserve the dendrogram structure with more utility. Attempt 4: Randomly permuting once. Finally, we propose to keep the dendrogram structure, but permute nodes only once at the last layer. We believe that this represents the right balance between preserving the utility of the dendrogram, and reducing the amount of revealed information. e parties can still infer in which order the clusters where merged and the internal topology of the clusters, which has applications in medicine and biology [23, 32] . At the same time, this approach hides the mapping of points to clusters and the exact ordering of cluster merging, thus preventing simple a acks based on inferring distances between points. Security de nition. We are ready to provide the de nition for privacy-preserving hierarchical clustering.
De nition 3.1. A protocol π = P 1 , P 2 is a secure privacypreserving hierarchical clustering in the presence of static, semihonest adversaries if it realizes the ideal functionality f * HC (dened in Figure 3 ). Speci cally, for i = 1, 2 and for all λ, there exists non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time Sim P i such that
, where x 1 , x 2 are the respective inputs of P 1 , P 2 , and view A π P i consists of the randomness tape of P i and all incoming messages received while running protocol π .
MAIN CONSTRUCTION
We now present our main protocol for privacy-preserving hierarchical clustering between two parties P 1 and P 2 .
e protocol is split into two phases: a one-time setup phase called HClustering.Setup (described in Algorithm 1), and an iterative algorithm called HClustering that repeatedly agglomerates the two closest clusters until the desired number of clusters is reached (described in Algorithm 2). e general ow of our main construction is depicted in Figure 4 . For clarity of presentation, we present the main construction for the case of single-dimensional data (d = 1). en, in Section 4.1 we discuss the necessary modi cations to accommodate more dimensions. Finally, in Section 4.2 we present a highly optimized protocol tailored to single linkage. 
e interaction ow of our main hierarchical clustering construction between parties P 1 , P 2 holding n 1 , n 2 points (n = n 1 + n 2 ). e protocol terminates once there are t clusters le and the parties learn for each cluster its size and representative. e parties also learn the permuted clustering tree.
Key insights. Designing e cient privacy-preserving protocols for a complex functionality like hierarchical clustering (with cubic cost in the input size) is technically challenging. We enumerate below the main challenges and our key insights to address them: -Computational complexity: Applying MPC protocols like Yao's GC or FHE to the entire computation is infeasible. We resort to mixed protocols, a design paradigm that combines AHE with GC (following [10, 18, 43, 51, 53] ). We decompose the computation into building blocks (e.g., comparison, minimum computation, cluster merging), design tailored e cient protocols for each of these, and nally combine the components. -Converting between representations: In mixed protocol design, a substantial cost is involved in converting inputs from Yao's GC to AHE. To reduce this cost, we use square Euclidian distance metric, which has the nice property that a distance computation between two points can be computed solely using AHE. -Protecting input privacy: To ensure privacy, we design a Setup protocol for randomly permuting and statistically blinding the inputs so that both parties are oblivious to the indices of their points in the dendrogram. -Iterative closest cluster computation: A signi cant cost in HC is incurred by the iterative computation to identify closest clusters. For single linkage, we store the index of the closest cluster to each cluster, and simply update that when merging clusters. is results in an optimized protocol with quadratic cost in input size. Secure comparison of values. Our construction uses several building blocks for secure comparison based on garbled circuits (see Appendix C for their implementation). First, ArgminSelect computes the index of the minimum value in a matrix of blinded Algorithm 1: HClustering.Setup: Setup Encrypted Clusters P 1 's Input : {p 1 , . . . , p n 1 },(pk, sk), pk P 2 's Input : {q 1 , . . . , q n 2 },(pk , sk ), pk 1 Phase I: Compute encrypted distance matrix 2 P 2 : 3 Compute n 2 × n 2 encrypted distance matrix B under pk , with
8 Construct an n × n encrypted symmetric matrix M where M i j is computed as follows:
, where the rst encryption is under pk and the other two come from Q j . 16 For each point p i , compute [p i ] under pk and set 19 Create two n × n encrypted randomness matrices R, R as follows.
Generate random values r i j ← {0, 1} κ for i, j = 1, . . . , n and set
, where the encryption is under pk , and R i j = [r i j ] where the encryption is under pk . 20 foreach i, j = 1 . . . n do 21 Blind M i j by se ing M i j ← M i j · R i j . 22 Create two encrypted lists S, S as follows. Generate random values
, where encryption is under pk , and
, where encryption is under pk . 25 Generate a random permutation π 1 (n), use it to permute the rows and columns of M, R and the lists L, S, and send them to P 2 .
P 2 :
27 Create an empty n × n matrix V. 28 foreach
Generate random values r i j ← {0, 1} κ for i, j = 1, . . . , n.
30
Decrypt M i j using sk and store the result at V i j .
31
Set
where encryption is under pk .
where encryption is under pk . 36 Generate a random permutation π 2 (n), use it to permute the rows and columns of matrices V, R and lists L, S, and send R, L, and S to P 1 .
37 Phase III: Unblind list L 38 P 1 : 39 Decrypt S using sk. Let σ 1 , . . . , σ n be the returned values.
where the encryption is under pk .
40 Decrypt R using sk and store the result at R i j for i, j = 1 . . . , n.
distances (e.g., [10, 46, 85] ). P 2 holds a blinded encrypted matrix V i j = i j + r i j for a large random value r i j that has been chosen by P 1 and is unknown to P 2 . On the other hand, P 1 holds the blinding factor r i j for each V i j . e garbled circuit for ArgminSelect takes all these values as inputs, removes the random factors, and compares all values. e nal output sent to both parties is the indexes of the minimum element min i, j { i j }. Second, we need protocols MinSelect and MaxSelect [6, 46] that operate on inputs u and blinded with randomness values r 1 and r 2 . e goal is to output either the minimum or maximum of the two values, blinded with a di erent factor. e function f that the two parties evaluate can be de ned as f (u, , r 1 , r 2 , r ) = min{u − r 1 , − r 2 } + r (or maximum for MaxSelect). e rst two input values are provided by P 2 , who also receives the nal output. e last three input values are provided by P 1 whose output is empty. Setup phase. e setup phase is an interactive process described in Algorithm 1. Initially P 1 holds points p 1 , . . . , p n 1 and P 2 holds points q 1 , . . . , q n 2 . Both parties have a Paillier encryption key pair, (pk, sk) and (pk , sk ) respectively. e protocol is based exclusively on AHE operations, its main goal being of preparing the data needed for the joint clustering protocol. e output is an encrypted matrix of blinded pairwise distances between all n = n 1 +n 2 points and the list of encrypted points known to P 1 , while P 2 holds the blinding randomness for the distance matrix.
e setup starts with Phase I (lines 1-16) for computing the encrypted pairwise distance matrix M and a list of encrypted points L. In lines 3-5, P 2 computes all pairwise Euclidean distances between his points q i and encrypts them under pk , creating a n 2 ×n 2 matrix B. For each point q i he also computes [q 2 i ], [−2q i ] and sends them to P 1 . In lines 7-15, P 1 computes his own pairwise distance matrix A. He then builds the joint encrypted distance matrix M as follows. He lls entries M i j with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n 1 (the "top-le " part of the matrix) with encryptions of the entries of A, i.e., distances between his own points. Likewise, he lls entries M i j with n 1 +1 ≤ i, j ≤ n 1 +n 2 (the "bo om-right" part of the matrix) with the entries of B, i.e., encryptions of distances between the points of P 2 . Finally, he lls all other entries with the encrypted distances of pairs p i , q j i.e., pairs where one point belongs to each party. is is achieved by exploiting the homomorphic properties of Paillier encryption:
. P 1 also encrypts his own points p i under pk and stores a list L of encrypted points (line 16).
Phase II performs shu ing and blinding of M and L. To motivate this, assume that both parties know the indices of their points in M. In that case, P 1 could learn that his cluster is merged with one of P 2 's points, implying that P 2 's point is closer than any other point of P 1 . In essence, this reveals signi cant information about the "internal topology" of the clusters and does not satisfy the security de nition. To eliminate the above leakage, P 1 and P 2 permute the rows and columns of M and L, and blind them with random values. First P 1 homomorphically "blinds" entries of M by random r i j ∈ {0, 1} κ , which he adds to M i j (lines [19] [20] [21] . κ is a statistical security parameter, used for the length of blinding factors. P 1 also blinds entries of L with random σ i , i ∈ [1, n] (lines [22] [23] [24] . en he chooses a random permutation π 1 (n) for the rows and columns of M, list L, as well as randomness matrix R = {r i j } and list S = {σ i } (line 25). P 1 sends both matrices and lists to P 2 . P 2 will now perform roughly the same process using a permutation π 2 of his choice (lines [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] . e result will be that, since each party knows only one of the two permutations, the output of π 2 •π 1 looks random to both of them. P 2 decrypts the blinded distance matrix with his secret key sk , adds fresh randomness r i j to each cell, and permutes the resulting table with π 2 . He also homomorphically blinds the randomness table R he received from P 1 using his freshly generated randomness and also permutes it. Finally, he repeats this process for L and the corresponding randomness list and sends the blinded encrypted matrix V, list L, and R, S, and L back to P 1 .
Lastly, in Phase III P 1 "unblinds" the list L. P 1 decrypts the list S using sk and then homomorphically "unblinds" list L. is is done by taking the decrypted randomness, multiply by −1 (modulo P 2 's choice of Paillier parameters), encrypt it under pk and homomorphically add it to corresponding element in list L. Note that, if the protocol has been executed correctly, this value is the additive inverse of the sum of the random values used by the two parties to blind this entry, which cancels out. e nal output for the two parties is as follows: P 2 holds a matrix V which contains the blinded encrypted pairwise distances, and P 1 holds a table with the corresponding randomness for each entry of V i j at the same position and a list L of the points encrypted under pk , such that the points are ordered in the same way as the columns and rows of V. e two tables and the list are permuted such that neither party can associate any element with a speci c party. Iterative clustering. Next, we explain how the main clustering phase of the protocol runs (see Algorithm 2) . e protocol follows the main steps of the hierarchical clustering algorithm from Figure 1 . Initially, each row i of V corresponds to a single-point cluster C i . e two parties run an iterative protocol where at each iteration (line 5-18) they identify the closest clusters according to the linkage metric, merge them into a new cluster, and update linkages to all other clusters. ese steps are performed with sub-protocols instantiated with Yao's garbled circuits.
In more details, the two parties nd in each round the location of the minimum distance between existing clusters with protocol ArgminSelect (lines 6-7). e output that both parties receive is the indexes i, j of the minimum value in the matrix (not the value itself). P 2 must at each iteration "merge" the two clusters C i , C j into a single cluster (lines 10-16), stored in row and column i, as follows. First, for each position k i, j he must set the distance of cluster k from this new cluster. To do so, the two parties run the comparison protocol for values V ik , V jk , i.e., the previous linkage between cluster C k and clusters C i , C j . Depending on the linkage method (single or complete), the two parties run either MinSelect or MaxSelect. is protocol also receives as input from P 1 a fresh random value ρ and produces a one-sided output: P 2 gets the minimum (resp. maximum) of the two values, blinded with ρ (and P 1 gets nothing). P 2 then stores this result at V ik and P 2 stores the randomness ρ at the same positions in his randomness table.
In order to recreate the clusters, P 1 maintains a data structure Λ storing indices of points from each cluster.
is is initialized in line 3 and updated a er cluster merging in line 8. Finally, P 2 Algorithm 2: HClustering: Privacy-preserving clustering
and they send pk, pk to each other. 2 P 2 sets level = 0 and runs HClustering.Setup with P 1 . 3 P 2 gets matrix V and P 1 gets matrix R and list L. 4 Initialize:
Find closest clusters: Let D = {V i j } i ≤j,i j be the blinded linkages between clusters C i , C j . 7 P 1 and P 2 execute ArgminSelect with P 2 's input as D and P 1 's input as {R i j } i ≤j,i j . 8 P 1 , P 2 get index α = ar min {D }, and compute i, j such that in + j = α . Cluster merging:
P 2 sets V ik and V k i to ⊥ and P 1 sets R ik and R k i to ⊥. Update cluster linkage: P 1 and P 2 execute MinSelect with P 2 's input V ik , V jk and P 1 's input R ik , R jk , ρ where ρ ∈ {0, 1} κ is randomly chosen by P 1 . P 2 gets value = min {V ik , V jk } + ρ and sets V ik and V k i to and P 1 sets R ik and R k i to ρ. Update cluster linkage: P 1 and P 2 execute MaxSelect with P 2 's input V ik , V jk and P 1 's input R ik , R jk , ρ where ρ ∈ {0, 1} κ is randomly chosen by P 1 . P 2 gets value = max {V ik , V jk } + ρ and sets V ik and V k i to P 1 sets R ik and R k i to ρ.
17
P 2 updates V and P 1 updates R by se ing the j-th row and column to ⊥.
18
P 2 sets ← + 1.
19 until > t ; 20 Representative computation: P 1 performs the following:
25 P 2 decrypts each value E i with sk to get cluster representative r ep i , which he sends back to P 1 . 26 Output generation: Both parties return as output the t pairs
sets all the values in the j-th row and column to ⊥, signifying the non-existence of a cluster at this position. e algorithm stops when t clusters are created (a er n − t rounds). Clearly, when the protocol terminates there are t non-null rows and columns, each corresponding to a cluster in the output. e last part of the protocol creates cluster representatives (lines [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] . is is achieved by exploiting the homomorphic properties of AHE. Using Λ, P 1 identi es which points go into each cluster. Assuming that cluster i includes points with indices i , P 2 computes j=1, ..., i L j = j=1, ..., i [p j ] and sends the resulting ciphertext to P 2 together with the cardinality | i | of the cluster.
e la er decrypts it using sk to get result rep i = j=1, ..., i p j and sends it back to P 2 . Both parties return as their nal output the t cluster representative/cardinality pairs (rep i /| i |, i ).
We now state the theorem capturing our construction security (full proof in Appendix D). T 4.1. Assuming Paillier's encryption scheme is semantically secure, MinSelect, MaxSelect, and ArgminSelect are instantiated with secure oblivious transfer and garbling scheme, the protocol π HC securely evaluates function f * HC as per De nition 3.1.
Asymptotic complexity. We assess the performance costs for the two parties during the execution of π HC . We assume that each cryptographic operation takes constant time. During the setup phase, the dominant cost for both parties comes from performing O(n 2 ) cryptographic operations (in order to populate tables V, R). e cost for garbling and evaluating a circuit C is O(|C |) where |C | is the number of wires in the circuit. During the round, ArgminSelect entails n 2 − 2 comparisons of d 2 -bit values (cluster distances) and subtractions of κ-bit values for a total size of O(κ(n 2 − )). Likewise, the size of each circuit for MinSelect/MaxSelect is of size O(κ) and n 2 − 2 such circuits are evaluated at round . e nal phase cost for both parties is O( t ). us, the total performance cost for both parties is O(κn 3 ), which is the same as the cost of unencrypted hierarchical clustering multiplied by a factor κ for the statistical hiding parameter. Extensions. Our protocol can be extended to other distance metrics, including L 1 , L 2 or Euclidian, and in general any L p distance for p ≥ 1. e only modi cation is computing the pairwise distance matrix during setup. We chose the squared Euclidian distance because it enables pairwise computation between the two parties' points solely using AHE and without interaction between the parties. If other distance metrics are used, then we need to design a mixed protocol for computing the pairwise distances initially.
Additional challenges emerge while trying to extend our protocols and maintain security in the malicious threat model, in which participants can mis-behave arbitrarily. Standard techniques such as augmenting the homomorphic ciphertexts with zero-knowledge proofs and cut-and-choose for garbled circuits can be applied, as well as, more recent developments in e cient secure computation [76] .
We believe that our protocols could be extended to support multiple participants, as typically considered by federated learning. is would require drastically di erent techniques to achieve practical performance but recent works provide promising results [44, 77] . One possible direction is to replace the garbled circuit components with secret sharing solutions as in Araki et al. [4] . We plan to explore this in follow-up work.
Scaling to multiple dimensions
So far we considered single-dimensional data (d = 1). In practice, hierarchical clustering is mostly applied to higher-dimension data (d > 1) and our protocol can be easily adapted. e core part of our protocol deals with comparisons between squared Euclidean distances, therefore it remains entirely una ected by the number of dimensions. e modi cations thus have to do with the setup process and the representative computation.
Initially, P 2 represents each point not by three but by 3d encryptions, essentially running step 4 of Algorithm 1 independently for each dimension. us, list Q consists of dn 2 encryptions and Q of 2dn 2 . en, P 1 does the same for his points and computes the values M i j (step 15) as the sum of the per dimension computation (which can be achieved with AHE). e shu ing process remains largely una ected, other than the fact that lists L, S, S consist of dn encryptions instead of n. Finally, the representative computation (Algorithm 2, step 23) needs to compute E i as a vector of d values.
Optimization for single linkage
We discuss how our protocol can be optimized if we focus only on single linkage. In particular, we present a modi ed version of the protocol that runs in time O(κn 2 ), as opposed to O(κn 3 ).
Our main protocol performs a quadratic number of comparisons in every round of clustering to identify the closest clusters.
is takes place with the sub-protocol ArgminSelect (steps 6-7 in Algorithm 2) which compares all the values in matrix V.
is "naive" approach works independently of the linkage function chosen. However, it turns out that for the case of single linkage we can use a much faster alternative that reduces the number of comparisons per round to O(n) (as opposed to O(n 2 )). is technique is well-known (e.g., see [52, Section 17.2.1]) and we explain it brie y.
A er computing the encrypted distance matrix V, the two parties compute the minimum distance per matrix row and store it in a separate array RowMin (RowMin[i] stores the minimum value in the i-th row of V). We note that this can be achieved by essentially running the ArgminSelect protocol separately per matrix row. en, during every clustering round instead of running the ArgminSelect protocol (steps 6-7 in Algorithm 2) in order to locate the minimum value in V, the two parties proceed as follows:
(1) P 1 , P 2 run ArgminSelect over the values of RowMin and get the index i of the cluster that corresponds to the row of V that contains the minimum values. (2) P 1 , P 2 run ArgminSelect over the values from the i-th row of V and get the index j of the closest cluster to cluster i. Moreover, a er updating the inter-cluster distances in V (steps 10-17 in Algorithm 2) the two parties have to update array RowMin.
is is done as follows:
(1) P 1 , P 2 repeatedly run MinSelect over the i-th row of V and store the minimum distance in
with V ki and store the result in RowMin [k] . Note that the above steps require at most 4(n − 1) comparisons, as opposed to at most n 2 /2 − 1 needed by our basic protocol to identify the minimum distance index. In practice, this results in signi cant improvements to the performance of our privacy-preserving hierarchical clustering solution, as demonstrated in Section 6, since all these comparisons are done using garbled circuits.
APPROXIMATE CLUSTERING
e cryptographic machinery required for our main privacy preserving hierarchical clustering protocol from Section 4 imposes overhead in practice.
is is due to the fact that the privacypreserving protocol performs the same number of operations as the standard (non-private) one, but every operation over plaintext values is replaced by a cryptographic operation. Independently of how well-optimized the cryptographic code is, cryptographic operations will ultimately be slower! erefore, to further scale to larger datasets, we explore how we can exploit e cient approximations. In particular, we adapt existing approximate clustering techniques to our private hierarchical clustering mechanism. We consider the CURE approximate clustering algorithm [35] and design for the rst time a privacy-preserving approximate clustering variant of CURE. CURE is a classical algorithm known to be resilient to outliers and achieve high accuracy with a relatively small number of samples (less than 1% of original data). Due to these advantages, we select CURE in our design but we believe similar privacy-preserving techniques can be applied to other approximate clustering algorithms (e.g., Birch [84] ).
CURE (see Algorithm 3) starts by sampling s data points from the original dataset of size n. en, Phase I Clustering (lines 2-5) partitions the sample into p equally-sized partitions. Standard hierarchical clustering algorithm is applied to each partition until the desired number of clusters s/(pq) is achieved (q is a parameter related to the number of clusters per partition). Phase I ends with outlier elimination, in which small clusters with less than t 1 points are eliminated. In Phase II Clustering (lines 6-8), another round of clustering is performed on the output by Phase I. At the end of the second clustering, small clusters with less than t 2 points are eliminated. Finally, a number of R representatives are selected per cluster and each point is assigned to the cluster of the closest representative (lines 9-10). e parameters of the CURE clustering algorithm and the values we selected according to the original paper are given in Table 1 .
Next, we design di erent privacy-preserving two-party approximate clustering algorithms based on CURE. e main design choice is to determine which steps of Algorithm 3 will be executed individually by each party, and at which phase the parties will start executing the protocol jointly. A er deciding on this, we discuss how the resulting scheme can be made privacy-preserving by using our constructions from Section 4 for hierarchical clustering. A naive implementation of two-party CURE algorithm will execute all phases of the protocol jointly, at the expense of higher computational complexity. At the other end of the spectrum, the parties will execute all phases disjointly and merge the resulting clusters at the very end. at will result in a much more e cient protocol (as the majority of the cost is born locally), at the expense of loss in accuracy. We thus study three variants of approximate CURE clustering (see Table 2 ). Joint I-II Clustering executes Phases I and II jointly, while the random sampling is done individually by parties. Second, Joint II Clustering executes only Phase II clustering jointly, but performs Phase I clustering individually at each party.
ird, Disjoint Clustering performs all the steps of the protocol (lines 1-10) locally at each party.
Integrating approximation with privacy
Let us now see how our approximation variants of CURE can be executed using our privacy-preserving clustering protocol. Disjoint Clustering. Clearly, for this case there is no need for modi cations-all data is handled locally by parties without any risk of leakage. Joint I-II Clustering. For this case there is one important challenge: how to make the transition from Phase I to Phase II. In particular, during Phase I the two parties can run p copies of our main construction in parallel, one for each partition, acquiring s/(pq) cluster representatives and sizes. Phase II should consist of a single execution of our protocol over the returned clusters. On the positive side, the necessary outlier elimination is trivial, just by looking at the returned cluster sizes from Phase I. However, to proceed to Phase II the inter-cluster distances of all the remaining clusters need to be computed. Unfortunately, this is clearly impossible given only the cluster representatives.
ere are various ways around this obstacle. For example, the parties can run a separate secure computation protocol, in order to compute inter-partition cluster distances and bootstrap Phase II. However, this introduces additional overhead. Alternatively, the parties can initiate Phase II by treating each cluster from Phase I as a singleton that consists only of its representative. However, this ignores the cluster size and may a ect the clustering accuracy. Instead, we take a simpler approach by se ing the number of partitions p = 1 for Phase I. In this case, all the intra-cluster distances are computed originally (since they all belong to the same "partition") and the transition between phases is seamless. Interestingly, this does not a ect the algorithm's accuracy. In fact, multiple partitions were originally introduced for e cient parallel processing [35, Section 4.2]. Indeed, our experimental evaluation indicates that the accuracy is not impacted by the choice of p. Joint II Clustering. In this case the parties perform Phase I separately (in a non-private way) and receive a number of clusters. en, they run Phase II using our privacy-preserving protocol over these returned clusters. Semantically, this looks like computing the dendrogram of Figure 2 starting at an intermediate level where some clusters already have multiple points.
One part of our protocol needs to be modi ed. In order to ll table V i j , the two parties run a slightly modi ed version of Algorithm 1. Table 2 : Two-party CURE clustering variants.
e algorithm computes inter-cluster distances in two ways. For clusters belonging to the same party, the distance is computed in the plain and then appropriately encrypted, similar to steps 2-7 in Algorithm 1, but this time using the speci ed linkage function. For each pair of clusters that belong to di erent owners, the parties run a sub-protocol that rst privately computes squared Euclidean distances across all possible pairs of points in the clusters, and then evaluates the inter-cluster distance based on the linkage type (single or complete). is sub-protocol is just our Setup Algorithm 1 but executed only on the points in these two clusters each time (followed by a number of secure comparisons to compute the nal distance). Not surprisingly, the cost for this step is O(κs 2 ) since we have at most s points across all clusters (s is the sample size) and Algorithm 1 is quadratic.
Representative selection and cluster assignment. One nal modi cation to the CURE algorithm that is necessary for both Joint I-II and Joint I-II Clustering has to do with the way nal representatives are selected and clusters assigned (steps 9-10 of Algorithm 3). Recall that our privacy-preserving hierarchical clustering protocol outputs a single representative for each cluster, its centroid. If we want to run CURE for R > 1, we run into a privacy issue: clusters in general contain points from both parties and it is not clear whether they are willing to explicitly reveal them to each other. One way to avoid this is to x R = 1 and set this value to be the representative that was output by our privacy preserving protocol for each cluster. Since this is the average value in the cluster this will o en be su ciently accurate, especially for spherical clusters. In fact, parameter R > 1 was originally introduced to improve accuracy for non-spherical clusters (see [35, Section 4.3] ).
If the parties have reasons to assume clusters of this form, they can follow a di erent approach, by se ing a leakage "threshold", i.e., by agreeing to reveal R points from each cluster to each other (the ownership of these points will be mixed ). We believe that this may be a realistic alternative for controlled disclosure, especially considering that R is quite small in practice (e.g., 3). 
EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
We implement the privacy preserving hierarchical clustering system based on our proposed protocol and show the experimental results in this section. e cryptographic protocol is implemented in C++, using the ABY framework [18] to realize the garbled circuits. We follow the standard parameter se ing from ABY and set the symmetric security parameter to 128 (for AES encryption in garbled circuits), public-key security parameter to 1024 (for homomorphic encryption), and statistical security parameter κ to 40 (for blinding factors). We use the code from libpaillier 1 for our Paillier encryption. We run our experiments on two 24-core machines (each running one party), with Scienti c Linux with 128GB memory and 2.9GHz Intel Xeon. e machines are on a university LAN with small RTT.
To evaluate our protocols we use a standard accuracy metric for clustering algorithms. We use datasets that include ground-truth labels (the correct class). A er performing clustering, we assign the majority class label to all points of a cluster. Accuracy is de ned as the fraction of points with correct labels relative to ground truth. In addition, we report running time and communication cost for our protocols. Our goal is to determine the tradeo s between accuracy and performance in privacy-preserving hierarchical clustering.
Dataset description
Real-world datasets. To evaluate clustering accuracy, we need labeled, multi-class datasets. We picked 4 datasets from the UCI ML Repository 2 , and restricted only to numeric a ributes. (1) Iris: a dataset with various types of iris plants, with 150 instances and 4 a ributes; (2) Wine: a dataset with results of chemical analysis of wines, with 178 records and 13 a ributes; (3) Heart: a heart disease diagnosis dataset, with 303 records and 20 a ributes; (4). Breast: a dataset that contains diagnostic Wisconsin Breast Cancer Database, with 569 records and 30 a ributes. Scalability experiments. We would like to test the scalability of our algorithms on much larger datasets (up to one million records). However, we need labeled multi-class datasets to evaluate the clustering accuracy, and we were not able to nd labeled real-world datasets of this size. Fortunately, the performance of our protocol depends mainly on the dataset size and varies very li le with the dataset dimension (as we will show experimentally). Moreover, the performance does not depend on the actual data values, as the type and sequence of cryptographic operations is data-independent. With these insights, we believe that it is su cient to evaluate the scalability of our protocol using synthetic datasets, as the results will be very similar on real large-scale data.
We generated synthetic datasets of up to one million records and various dimensions d ∈ [1, 20] following a Gaussian mixture distribution with the following parameters: (1) the number of clusters was chosen randomly between 8 and 15; (2) the cluster centers selected randomly in interval [−50, 50] d , where we imposed a minimum separation between cluster centers (we stress that the choice of bounds for the values does not a ect performancecomputational costs are dominated by the κ additive parameter which is 40 bits); (3) standard deviation of the clusters randomly selected in [0. 5, 4] . We generated di erent percentages of outliers to emulate di erent scenarios: low (0.1%), medium (1%), and high (5%). Outliers are generated uniformly at random in the same interval and assigned randomly to clusters. A visualization of one of the sample datasets generated by our method is given in Figure 5 .
Performance of our basic protocol
We report the performance of our privacy-preserving protocol from Section 4, denoted by Basic. To evaluate the performance in our two-party se ing, we randomly split the dataset and each party gets half the total number of records. We set the desired number of clusters t = 5. e cost of our protocols is linear in the number of iterations (n − t ), so the results we obtain for t = 5 are upper bounds on the running time of the protocol (as in general more than 5 clusters are desired).
Figures 6a and 6b show the computational and communication cost for synthetic datasets of di erent sizes and dimensions. First of all, observe that dimension d has minimal impact on the former and no impact at all for the la er. is is due to the fact that most of the overhead is related to operating on distances between values/clusters, which is minimally a ected by d (this is also consistent with our analysis in Section 4.1). In general, we observe that both costs increase steeply with the size n of the datasets. is is not surprising given the cubic asymptotic complexity of Basic. Still, for small real datasets such as the ones we experimented on ( Figure 7a ) the communication is < 100MB and the computation time is under 4 minutes, which is reasonable in practice.
Performance of our optimized protocol
Next, we report the performance of our optimized protocol for the single linkage variant from Section 4.2, denoted by Opt. Figure 6c reports the computation time and Figure 6d the total communication size on synthetic data. e optimized version signi cantly improves both aspects, which is in line with our analysis from Section 4.2. For example, for a dataset with 2000 points with dimensionality 20, the running time is approximately 230 secs, which is around 8× faster than the Basic version. e performance improvement is even more pronounced for the case of communication size. For example, for the largest tested dataset, the communication cost decreases from 9GB to 26MB-almost a 400× improvement! e di erence in the magnitude of improvement between computation time and communication size is explained by the following observation. Opt does not improve the performance during the setup phase (indeed, it makes it slightly more costly), and setup time represents a large percentage of the total protocol time. In contrast, the amount of communication in setup is small relative to total protocol communication. We also evaluate the performance of Opt on several real datasets in Figure 7b . Again, we observe a signi cant improvement from Basic, e.g., for Breast, it takes under 35 seconds and less than 2.5 MB total communication.
Approximate clustering evaluation
We evaluate the three variants of privacy-preserving approximate clustering algorithms and compare their accuracy to the original CURE algorithm. Figure 8 shows the accuracy of these three variants and the CURE algorithm on synthetic datasets with one million records generated as explained above (for p = 1 partitions). Appendix A includes similar results for p = 5 partitions. We consider three se ings for outliers: low (0.1%), medium (1%), and high (5%), and vary the sample size in CURE between 100 and 1000. Our main observations are the following:
-e Disjoint Clustering algorithm in which CURE is run individually by each party and clusters are merged at the very end has poor accuracy. Indeed, this is not surprising, as each party generates clusters based on its own local samples and there is no interaction during the protocol. is variant will not incur the overhead of cryptographic operations, but the loss in accuracy (e.g., by 44.4% for one million records) is signi cant. -For one partition (p = 1), Joint I-II Clustering and Joint II Clustering have similar accuracy to CURE for su ciently large sample sizes. At 300 samples or higher, the accuracy of both variants is within 3% of the original CURE algorithm.
-We varied the partition size and observed that for higher values of p (e.g., p = 5) there is a di erence between Joint I-II Clustering and Joint II Clustering for small sample sizes. For instance, at 200 sample size, the accuracy for Joint II Clustering is lower by 39 .54% than that of Joint I-II Clustering. Still, when we increase the sample size above 500 records, the accuracies of the two variants are within 3.18%.
-We ran the approximate protocol with all combinations of p = 1, 3, 5 partitions and R = 1, 3, 5, 7, 10 representatives and observed that the accuracies of Joint I-II Clustering and Joint II Clustering are very close to CURE at s = 1000 samples.
e largest di erence we observed between Joint II Clustering and CURE is 3.57%, and between Joint I-II Clustering and CURE is 2.7%. For p = 1 and R = 1 the di erence is less than 1% for 1000 samples.
erefore, our choice of p = 1 and R = 1 to protect data privacy, as argued in Section 5, does not impact the protocol's accuracy.
Based on these results, the Joint II Clustering variant is the preferred two-party approximate clustering method, for large enough sample sizes. It achieves accuracy close to the original CURE algorithm and lower overhead than other variants, while protecting data privacy for our parameter choice.
End-to-end approximation evaluation
We present the end-to-end approximation results to demonstrate that our protocol can be scaled to datasets up to one million records. We stress that, since the communication overhead is so small with our Opt protocol, network latency e ect on end-to-end time is almost negligible; the vast majority of the time is spent on cryptographic operations. We select one million records, d = 10 dimensions with 1% outliers and choose the Opt version of our protocol. We set the partition to be p = 1 for the approximation and the number of clusters t = 5. We set q = 3 for Joint II Clustering. Figure 9 shows the performance of the Joint I-II Clustering and Joint II Clustering for sample sizes s between 400 and 1000. e overall performance is practical, for example, with s = 1000 samples the cost of performing Joint I-II Clustering is 104 seconds, while the running time of Joint II Clustering is 35 seconds, which is faster by a factor of more than 3× compared to Joint I-II Clustering at a similar accuracy level (97.09%). e communication cost of Joint I-II Clustering is 6.5MB, while the cost of Joint II Clustering is 896KB, a factor of 7.25 smaller than that of Joint I-II Clustering.
RELATED WORK
e risks of information leakage in supervised learning has been demonstrated in practical a acks that either infer private information about the training data or the ML model and its hyperparameters [27, 38, 68] . To the best of our knowledge, no inference a ack against unsupervised learning models has been proposed. A large body of literature has been proposed to mitigate the attacks against supervised learning. e majority of these focus on classi cation models, including decision trees [50] , SVM classication [75] , linear regression [20, 21, 65] , logistic regression [26] , and neural networks [7, 58, 64] . Recently, a fast-growing number of works (e.g., [3, 10, 13, 14, 28, 30, 31, 37, 43, 47, 51, 53, 56, 61, 63] ) achieve very strong security guarantees in this se ing, by providing concrete security de nitions and provably secure protocols that utilize multiple secure computation techniques [60] . Most of these works utilize highly e cient cryptographic back-ends to provide scalable solutions for supervised learning, o en in the se ing where an ML model is rst trained over plaintext data and then is used for predictions at testing time in a privacy-preserving manner. Privacy-preserving federated learning is a recent design [9] in which multiple mobile users update a global model by sharing aggregated updates to model parameters. e vast majority of works on privacy-preserving unsupervised learning study the problem of k-means clustering (e.g., see [11, 19, 24, 41, 42, 74] ). Much less a ention has been given to the problem of privacy-preserving hierarchical clustering, and existing works either lack formal security de nitions and proofs [17, 39, 40] , do not provide implementations [66] , or both. One notable exception is [72] but that work provides a solution tailored only to the speci c problem of document clustering.
An entirely di erent approach that applies to both types of learning a empts to preserve privacy through data perturbation (e.g., [1, 15, 16, 57, 67, 69] ), i.e., by introducing statistical noise to hide the exact values, o en by employing di erential privacy [22] .
ese techniques are orthogonal to ours and can potentially be applied in unison towards a possibly more robust security treatment.
Finally, the interplay between cryptographic protocols and ecient approximation was rst studied in [25] . Subsequent works have o ered optimized protocols for various problems, e.g., pattern matching in genomic data [5, 78] , k-means [71] , and logistic regression [73, 80] . To the best of our knowledge, ours is the rst work to compose secure cryptographic protocols with e cient approximation algorithms for hierarchical clustering.
CONCLUSION
We address the problem of privacy-preserving hierarchical clustering. We propose for the rst time a formal security de nition in the framework of secure computation. We design a secure clustering protocol that satis es the de nition for single and complete linkage, as well as an optimized version for the former. Finally, we combine our protocols with e cient approximate clustering in order to achieve the best of both worlds: strong security guarantees and scalability. Our experimental evaluation demonstrates that our protocol is e cient and scalable to one million records. We believe this work opens up new avenues of research in privacy-preserving unsupervised learning, e.g., design secure protocols for other linkage types (e.g., Ward) and other learning algorithms such as mixture models, association rules, and graph learning. Interesting avenues for future work include extending our protocols to the malicious threat model and supporting multiple participants.
A ADDITIONAL RESULTS Figure 10 shows the accuracy of several variants of approximate clustering and the original CURE algorithm on synthetic datasets with one million records, for p = 5 partitions. We vary the number of outliers to low, medium, and high, as done in the experiments from Figure 8 . We observe results that are similar to experiments described in Section 6.4. In particular, the accuracy loss of Disjoint Clustering variant is substantial, while the accuracy of the Joint I-II Clustering and Joint II Clustering variants is comparable to that of the original CURE algorithm for sample sizes larger than 500 points.
B GARBLED CIRCUITS
Here, we provide a more detailed description of garbled circuits and a running example in Figure 11 . We defer readers to [49? ] for a thorough formal treatment. Consider two parties, P 1 and P 2 that wish to evaluate a function f over their respective inputs x 1 , x 2 . One of the parties will play the role of the garbler and the other will play the role of the evaluator. Without loss of generality assume P 1 is the garbler and P 2 is the evaluator. eir interaction proceeds as follows.
First P 1 expresses f as a Boolean circuit, i.e., as a directed acyclic graph of Boolean AND and OR gates, and sends a "garbled" version of the circuit to P 2 . We provide a concrete example in Figure 11 that depicts a Boolean circuit of two AND gates A, B and an OR gate C.
e input x 1 is 11 whereas x 2 is 01 (both expressed in bits).
e normal circuit should rst compute the bitwise AND of the two inputs and forwards the results to the OR gate. In order to garble the circuit, P 1 will pick two random values from a large domain (e.g., 128-bits each) for the two possible bits of each wire of the circuit. We call these the garbled values for that wire. More concretely, if the rst (second) bit of P 1 's and P 2 's inputs is to be inserted into gate A (resp. B), P 1 selects w 0 11 , w 1 11 , w 0 21 , w 1
21
(resp. w 0 12 , w 1 12 , w 0 22 , w 1 22 ). Mnemonically, the subscript of a w value for input wires corresponds to the party that provides it and the index of the bit on its input, whereas the superscript indicates the wire's plaintext bit (e.g., w 0 21 is the value for P 2 's rst bit in case that is a zero). Proceeding further into the circuit, P 1 picks
C for the possible bit outputs of gates A, B, and C respectively. Without knowing how these random values where chosen, it is impossible to infer which corresponds to which bit. Note that w 0 C , w 1 C correspond to the nal circuit output, i.e., to the value f (x 1 , x 2 ).
Next, P 1 creates a garbled truth Figure 11 : Garbled circuit for a function that takes two bits from each party, computes their pairwise AND and an OR over the result.
scheme (e.g., 128-bit AES) P 1 double-encrypts (i.e., encrypts twice in a layer manner) this possible output for A as E A ) are indistinguishable from random, due to the semantic security of the encryption scheme. In order for P 2 to be able to retrieve the nal output, P 1 also sends the output wire values w 0 C , w 1 C together with their corresponding mapping to 0 and 1. Observe that, given the garbled truth tables values, if P 2 knows the w value of each input wire of a gate, she can easily discover its output value. For example, if she has w 1 11 , w 1 21 , she can try to decrypt every value in the truth table until she nds the correct value w 1
A .
Note that, we need to assume that the encryption scheme allows detection of well-formed decryptions, i.e., it is possible to deduce whether the retrieved plaintext has a correct format. is can be easily achieved using a blockcipher and padding with a su cient number of 0's, in which case well-formed decryptions will have a long su x of 0's and decryptions under the wrong key will have a su x of random bits. is property is referred to as veri able range in [49] . P 2 sends the w values corresponding to his inputs (w 1 11 , w 0 12 ) in the clear. Since these are random values, P 2 cannot map them to 0 or 1, thus P 1 's input is protected. e last technical challenge is for P 2 to retrieve the w values corresponding to his own input (i.e., w 1 21 is is achieved through a two-party secure computation protocol called (1-out-of-2) oblivious transfer (OT) [? ]. At a very high level, and focusing on the rst bit of S's input, P 2 can retrieve via OT from P 1 exactly one value from pair (w 0 21 , w 1 21 ), without P 1 learning which of the two. To transfer all the necessary w values, the parties must execute (in parallel) an OT protocol for every bit of P 2 's input. A er retrieving these w values, P 2 evaluates the circuit on her own as described above, and sends the output bit (1 in our example) to P 1 .
C SUB-PROTOCOLS FOR SECURE COMPARISON
Here we show circuits for ArgminSelect, MinSelect, and MaxSelect as de ned in Section 4. ese circuits are garbled and evaluated as described in Section 2 and called as sub-routines during our protocol from Section 4, We assume values of λ bits, and blinding randomness of κ bits, which makes the sum κ + 1 bits long. e nal output of the circuit is denoted by an arrow in the gures. e circuits use as building blocks gates for addition/subtraction ADD/SUB of κ + 1-bit integers and minimum/maximum comparison MIN/MAX of two λ-bit integers. By convention, the la er output a single bit that indicates which is the minimum/maximum value (e.g., MIN on input 3, 5 outputs 0 to indicate the rst value is smaller). We also need a multiplexer gate MUX i that upon input two inputs consisting of i bits each, and a selector bit s chooses the rst or the second one, depending on the value of s. e circuit for ArgminSelect operates on n di erent inputs and returns the index of the minimum one. To facilitate the nal return of the index (without having to explicitly provide it as input), we hard-code in the circuit "constant" gates CON i that always output a xed value 1 ≤ i ≤ n, e.g., CON 3 always outputs the binary representation of 3 using log n bits. Alternatively, we could provide the indexes as input and "carry" them throughout the circuit. E cient implementations for the above types of gates can be found in existing literature (e.g., [46] ). Figure 12 shows the circuit for MinSelect. It takes as input ve values u, , r 1 , r 2 , r where the rst two are of κ + 1 bits and the last three are of κ bits. It rst computes u − r 1 and − r 2 using two SUB gates. en it computes the minimum of the two values using a MIN gate the output of which is forwarded to a MUX λ gate that takes as input the values u − r 1 and − r 2 . Finally, it blinds the output of the multiplexer again by adding r with a ADD gate, before outpu ing it. e circuit for MaxSelect is the same but uses a MAX gate instead. Figure 13 shows the circuit for ArgminSelect. It takes as input 2n values 1 , . . . , n and r 1 , . . . , r n . e rst n values are of κ + 1 bits whereas the rest are of κ bits. First, it uses n SUB gates to compute values i −r i for i = 1, . . . , n. en it uses n−1 MIN gates to compare the minimum as follows. e rst gate compares 1 , 2 . It outputs a bit that is fed to a MUX gate as the selector.
e input values for this multiplexer are provided by constant gates CON 1 ,CON 2 .
e output of MIN is also fed to another MUX gate that takes as input 1 − r 1 and 2 − r 2 . e outputs of the two multiplexer gates correspond to the current minimum value and index. ey are then forwarded to a new MIN gate for comparison with 3 − r 3 and the process continues iteratively. For the i-th comparison, the index MUX gate will take the current minimum index and the output of CON i+1 . e nal output a er n − 1 comparisons is given by the last index MUX gate.
D PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1
We begin by recalling that, under the assumption that the oblivious transfer protocol used is secure, there exists simulator Sim OT that can simulate the views of each of the parties P 1 , P 2 during a single oblivious transfer execution when given as input the corresponding party's input (and output, in case it is non-empty) and randomness. e core idea behind our proof is that, since all values seen by the two parties during the protocol execution (apart from the indexes of the merged clusters at each round) are "blinded" by large random factors. For example, assuming all values p i , q i are 32-bits and the chosen random values are 100-bits, it follows that the sum of the two is statistically indistinguishable from a 100-bit value chosen uniformly at random. In particular, this allows the simulator to e ectively run the protocol with the adversary by simply choosing simulated values for the other party which he chooses himsellf at random (in the above example these would be random 32-bit values). We will handle the two case of corruption separately. 
. . , α t , computes the view of P 2 as follows.
• (Ciphertext computation) Using random tape R 2 , the simulator runs the key generation algorithm for P 2 to receive sk , pk . He then chooses values p 1 , . . . , p n 1 uniformly at random from {0, 1} d . ese will act as the "simulated" values for player P 1 . He then runs π HC honestly using the values p i as input for P 1 (and the actual values q i of P 2 ), with the following modi cations.
• (Oblivious transfer simulation for OT ) For = 1, . . . , t let W be the set of garbled input values computed by P 2 for the garbled circuit that evaluates MinSelect/MaxSelect at round . Since we are in the semihonest se ing, the corrupted P 2 computes these values uniformly at random. erefore, the simulator can also compute them using R 2 . en, for i = 1, . . . , , the simulator includes in the view (instead of OT ) the output OT produced by simulator Sim (2) OT on input W . 3 Note that P 2 does not receive any output from this oblivious transfer execution, thus Sim (2) OT only works given the input.
• (Oblivious transfer simulation for ArgminSelect) For each round , the simulator includes in the view, the index α .
• (Garbled circuit simulation for GC ,k ) Next, the simulator needs to compute the garbled circuits GC ,k . e simulator uses the corresponding values from R (as computed so far) and a "new" blinding factor ρ , k for P 1 ' inputs and computes a garbled circuit for evaluating ArgminSelect honestly. e simulator also includes in the view of P 2 the garbled inputs for the corresponding elements from R. • (Oblivious transfer simulation for OT ,k ) Let ,k be the input of P 2 for the circuit GC ,k (i.e., the execution of ArgminSelect for index k during round ). Since we are in the semi-honest case, the corrupted P 2 will provide as input the values that have been established from the interaction with P 1 (using the points p i ) up to that point, therefore ,k can be computed by the simulator. In order to compute the parts of the view that correspond to each of OT ,k the simulator includes in the view the output of Sim OT on input ,k and the corresponding choice from each pair of garbled inputs he chose in the previous step (as dictated by the bit representation of ,k ), which we denote as OT ,k .
• (Encrypted representatives computation) For = 1, . . . , t , the simulator computes rep = rep /| | · | i | and E = [rep ], where encryption is under (the previously computed) pk. We now argue that the view produced by our simulator is indistinguishable from the view of P 2 when interacting with P 1 running π H C . is is done via the following sequence of hybrids. Hybrid 0. is is the view view A π H C P 2 , i.e., the view of P 2 when interacting with P 1 running π H C for points p i . Hybrid 1. is is the same as Hybrid 0, but the output of GC in view A π H C P 2 is replaced by α . is is indistinguishable from Hybrid 0 due to the correctness of the garbling scheme. Since we are in the semi-honest se ing, both parties follow the protocol, therefore the outputs they evaluate are always α . Hybrid 2.
is is the same as Hybrid 1, but values in M, L are computed using values p i .
is is statistically indistinguishable from Hybrid 1 (i.e., even unbounded algorithms can only distinguish between the two with probability O(2 κ ) since in view A π H C P 2 each of the values in M, L are computed as the sum of a random value from {0, 1} κ and a distance between two clusters. Hybrid 3.
is is the same as Hybrid 2, but all values in R, S are replaced with encryptions of zero's. is is indistinguishable from Hybrid 2 due to the semantic security of Paillier's encryption scheme. Hybrid 4. is is the same as Hybrid 3, but each of OT is replaced by OT , computed as described above.
is is indistinguishable from Hybrid 3 due to the security of the oblivious transfer protocol. Hybrid 5.
is is the same as Hybrid 4, but the garbled inputs given to P 2 for GC ,k are chosen based on the values that have been computed using values p i . Since garbled inputs are chosen uniformly at random (irrespectively of the actual input values), this follows the same distribution as Hybrid 3. Hybrid 6. is is the same as Hybrid 5, but each of OT ,k is replaced by output of OT ,k computed as described above. is is indistinguishable from Hybrid 5 due to the security of the oblivious transfer protocol. Hybrid 7. is is the same as Hybrid 6, but each value E i sens to P 2 is computed as [ rep i /| i | · | i | ] using public key pk . is is indistinguishable from Hybrid 6 since we are in the semi-honest se ing and both parties follow the protocol therefore the outputs they evaluate are always rep i /| i |.
Note that Hybrid 7 corresponds to the view produced by our simulator and Hybrid 0 to the view that P 2 receives while interacting with P 1 during π H C which concludes this part of the proof. Corruption of P 1 . e case where P 1 is corrupted is somewhat simpler as he does not receive any outputs from the circuits GC ,k .
e view of P 1 during the protocol execution consists of: (1) Encrypted tables B, R and encrypted lists Q, Q , L, S.
(2) For each round of clustering , a garbled circuit GC for evaluating ArgminSelect, messages received during the corresponding oblivious transfer execution denoted by OT .
(3) During each round of clustering , for each execution of MinSelect/MaxSelect for index k, messages received during the corresponding oblivious transfer execution denoted by OT ,k . e simulator Sim P 1 , on input the random tape R 1 , points p 1 , . . . , p n 1 , outputs (rep 1 /| 1 |, | 1 |, . . . , rep t /| t |, | t |), α 1 , . . . , α t , computes the view of P 1 as follows.
• (Ciphertext computation) Using random tape R 1 , the simulator runs the key generation algorithm for P 1 to receive sk, pk and computes a pair sk , pk for himself. He computes B, Q, Q , L consisting of encryptions of zeros under pk . Moreover, he computes R,S consisting of encryption of values chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1} κ and encrypted under pk.
• (Garbled circuit simulation for GC ) Next the simulator needs to provide garbled circuits for the evaluation of ArgminSelect for each round of clustering . For this, the simulator creates a "rigged" garbled circuit GC that always outputs α , irrespectively of the inputs. is is achieved by forcing all intermediate gates to always return the same garbled output and by se ing the output translation temple to always to decode to the bit-representation of α (this process is explained formally in [49] ).
• (Oblivious transfer simulation for ArgminSelect) Let W
, W
be the sets of pairs of input garbled values that the simulator choses while creating GC as described above (where the former corresponds to the input of P 1 and the la er to the input of P 2 ).
e simulator includes in the view a random choice from each pair in W (2) . Moreover, he replaces the messages in the view that correspond to the execution of OT ,k , by the output of Sim OT on input ( ,W (1) ), where is the bit description of the input of P 1
for GC (which can be computed with the simulator since he has access to p i , R 1 ).
• (Oblivious transfer simulation for MinSelect/MaxSelect) For each GC ,k let W ,k be the set of garbled input values computed by P 1 for the garbled circuit that evaluates MinSelect/MaxSelect at round and cluster k. Since we are in the semi-honest se ing, the corrupted P 1 computes these values uniformly at random. erefore, the simulator can also compute them using random tape R 1 .
en, for each , k the simulator includes in the view (instead of OT ,k ) the output OT ,k produced by simulator Sim OT on input W ,k (and corresponding randomness derived from R 1 ). Note that P 1 does not receive any output from this oblivious transfer execution, thus Sim OT only works given the input. We now argue that the view produced by our simulator is indistinguishable from the view of P 1 when interacting with P 2 running π HC . is is done via the following sequence of hybrids. Hybrid 0. is is the view view A π H C P 1 , i.e., the view of P 1 when interacting with P 2 running π HC for points q i . Hybrid 1. is is the same as Hybrid 0, but all values in B, Q, Q , L are replaced with encryptions of zero's. is is indistinguishable from Hybrid 1 due to the semantic security of Paillier's encryption scheme. Hybrid 2.
is is the same as Hybrid 1, but values in R, S are computed as encryptions of values chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1} κ under key pk. is is statistically indistinguishable from Hybrid 1 for the same reasons as for the case of P 2 above. Hybrid 3. is is the same as Hybrid 2, but each of GC is replaced by GC , computed as described above (including the values from W (2) ) is is indistinguishable from Hybrid 2 due to the security of encryption scheme used for the garbling scheme (this is formally described in [49] ).
Hybrid 4. is is the same as Hybrid 3, but each of OT is replaced by OT , computed as described above.
is is indistinguishable from Hybrid 3 due to the security of the oblivious transfer protocol. Hybrid 5. is is the same as Hybrid 4, but each of OT ,k is replaced by OT ,k computed as described above. is is again indistinguishable from Hybrid 5 due to the security of the oblivious transfer protocol.
Note that Hybrid 5 corresponds to the view produced by our simulator and Hybrid 0 to the view that P 2 receives while interacting with P 1 during π HC which concludes this part of the proof.
